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| Joined: | Mon Nov 21st, 2005 |
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Those who are victims are those who bear a measure of accurate accountability for having failed to avoid becoming victims.
Why?
Evidence:
“It was a principle of the Common Law, as it is of the law of nature, and of common sense, that no man can be taxed without his personal consent. The Common Law knew nothing of that system, which now prevails in England, of assuming a man’s own consent to be taxed, because some pretended representative, whom he never authorized to act for him, has taken it upon himself to consent that he may be taxed. That is one of the many frauds on the Common Law, and the English constitution, which have been introduced since Magna Carta. Having finally established itself in England, it has been stupidly and servilely copied and submitted to in the United States.”
Source:
Lysander Spooner, An Essay on The Trial by Jury, 1852
The English victims were collectively stupid and then servile.
Why?
Evidence:
Exhibit A:
"Farther, though it be said here, that the king hath given and granted these liberties, yet it must not be understood that they were meer emanations of Royal favour, or new bounties granted, which the people could not justly challenge, or had not a right unto before; for as lord Coke in divers places asserts, and as is well known to every gentleman professing the law, this charter is, for the most part, only declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws and liberties of England. Not any new freedom is hereby granted, but a restitution of such as the subject lawfully had before, and to free them from the usurpations and incroachments of every power whatever. It is worthy observation, that this charter often mentions sua jura, their rights, and libertates suas, their liberties, which shews they were before intitled to and possessed them, and that those rights and liberties were by this charter not granted as before unknown, but confirmed, and that in the stile of liberties and privileges long before well known.”
Source:
English Liberties, Or The Free-Born Subject’s Inheritance: Containing Magna Charta,
The Habeas Corpus Act, And Several Other Statutes, Henry Care
Boston: Printed by J. Franklin, for N. Buttolph, B. Eliot, and D. Henchman, 1721
Exhibit B:
“By the late sixteenth century, and especially with the accession of the Stuarts, the court of chancery was closely associated with the royal prerogative and became the target of opposition. Equity was therefore disadvantageously contrasted with common law in an era when “ancient law” took on revolutionary constitutional overtones. The struggle between the two systems of law became explicit in Glandville’s case, the 1616 litigation, jurisdiction over which sought by Chancellor Ellsmere, who enjoined suitors from proceeding at law, and by Chief Justice Coke, who prohibited the same litigants from proceeding in equity, and in which James I finally intervened on the side of chancery. The common lawyers of the early Stuart period strongly objected to the prerogative character of equital law, but they also attacked particular abuses: the use of chancery jobs as royal patronage, the delay and expense of chancery proceedings, and the increasing formalism of equity litigation. At bottom, of course, they anticipated Selden, who sneered that “Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the standard for measure a Chancellor’s foot.””
Source:
Perspectives in American History, Law in American History, Fleming and Bailyn
The English victims collectively paid for their eventual servitude as they collectively lost the power to hold to an accurate accounting the criminals in pubic offices.
In America, the same routine occurred in which the criminals took over the power to hold the criminals to an accurate accounting of the facts that matter, in any case, civil or criminal, foreign or domestic, in or out of public office.
Evidence:
Exhibit A:
"The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and expensive, and justice as unattainable by a great part of the community, as in England; and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor."
Source:
George Mason, Objections to This Constitution of Government, September 1787
Exhibit B:
“They proved their effectiveness during the Colonial and Revolutionary periods in helping the colonists resist imperial interference. They provided a similar source of strength against outside pressure in the territories of the western United States, in the subject South following the Civil War, and in Mormon Utah. They frequently proved the only effective weapon against organized crime, malfeasance in office, and corruption in high places.
“But appreciation of the value of grand juries was always greater in times of crisis, and, during periods when threats to individual liberty were less obvious, legal reformers, efficiency experts, and a few who feared government by the people worked diligently to overthrow the institution. Proponents of the system, relying heavily on the democratic nature of the people's panel, on its role as a focal point for the expression of the public needs and the opportunity provided the individual citizen for direct participation in the enforcement of law, fought a losing battle. Opponents of the system leveled charges of inefficiency and tyranny against the panels of citizen investigators and pictured them as outmoded and expensive relics of the past. Charges of "star chamber" and "secret inquisition" helped discredit the institution in the eyes of the American people, and the crusade to abolish the grand jury, under the guise of bringing economy and efficiency to local government, succeeded in many states.”
Source: The People's Panel, The Grand Jury in the United States, 1634 - 1941
Richard D. Younger,
Exhibit C:
"For decades before and after the Revolution, the adjudication of criminals in America was governed primarily by the rule of private prosecution: (1) victims of serious crimes approached a community grand jury, (2) the grand jury investigated the matter and issued an indictment only if it concluded that a crime should be charged, and (3) the victim himself or his representative (generally an attorney but sometimes a state attorney general) prosecuted the defendant before a petit jury of twelve men. Criminal actions were only a step away from civil actions - the only material difference being that criminal claims ostensibly involved an interest of the public at large as well as the victim. Private prosecutors acted under authority of the people and in the name of the state - but for their own vindication. The very term "prosecutor" meant criminal plaintiff and implied a private person. A government prosecutor was referred to as an attorney general and was a rare phenomenon in criminal cases at the time of the nation's founding. When a private individual prosecuted an action in the name of the state, the attorney general was required to allow the prosecutor to use his name - even if the attorney general himself did not approve of the action.
Private prosecution meant that criminal cases were for the most part limited by the need of crime victims for vindication. Crime victims held the keys to a potential defendant's fate and often negotiated the settlement of criminal cases. After a case was initiated in the name of the people, however, private prosecutors were prohibited from withdrawing the action pursuant to private agreement with the defendant. Court intervention was occasionally required to compel injured crime victims to appear against offenders in court and "not to make bargains to allow [defendants] to escape conviction, if they...repair the injury."
Source:
The Conviction Factory: The Collapse of America's Criminal Courts, Roger Roots, 2014
Exhibit D:
"In fact, the Supreme Court has granted prosecutors absolute immunity from civil liability for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.88"
88. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 79 n.54 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Enforcement] (stating that "prosecutors have absolute immunity for misconduct related to their prosecutorial function").
Source:
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, Lisa M. Kurcias, FordhamL. Rev. 1205 (2000).
Reminder:
“For more than six hundred years—that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215—there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge of the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such laws.
Unless such be the right and duty of jurors, it is plain that, instead of juries being a “palladium of liberty”—a barrier against the tyranny and oppression of the government—they are really mere tools in its hands, for carrying into execution any injustice and oppression it may desire to have executed.
But for their right to judge of the law, and the justice of the law, juries would be no protection to an accused person, even as to matters of fact; for, if the government can dictate to a jury any law whatever, in a criminal case, it can certainly dictate to them the laws of evidence. That is, it can dictate what evidence is admissible, and what inadmissible, and also what force or weight is to be given to the evidence admitted. And if the government can thus dictate to a jury the laws of evidence, it can not only make it necessary for them to convict on a partial exhibition of the evidence rightfully pertaining to the case, but it can even require them [6] to convict on any evidence whatever that it pleases to offer them.
That the rights and duties of jurors must necessarily be such as are here claimed for them, will be evident when it is considered what the trial by jury is, and what is its object.
“The trial by jury,” then, is a “trial by the country”—that is, by the people—as distinguished from a trial by the government.
It was anciently called “trial per pais”—that is “trial by the country.” And now, in every criminal trial, the jury are told that the accused “has, for trial, put himself upon the country; which country you (the jury) are.”
The object of this trial “by the country,” or by the people, in preference to a trial by the government, is to guard against every species of oppression by the government. In order to effect this end, it is indispensable that the people, or “the country,” judge of and determine their own liberties against the government; instead of the government’s judging of and determining its own powers over the people. How is it possible that juries can do anything to protect the liberties of the people against the government, if they are not allowed to determine what those liberties are?
Any government, that is its own judge of, and determines authoritatively for the people, what are its own powers over the people, is an absolute government of course. It has all the powers that it chooses to exercise. There is no other—or at least no more accurate—definition of a despotism than this.”
Source:
Lysander Spooner, An Essay on The Trial by Jury, 1852
Prescription:
Hold the worst criminals to account first, do so lawfully, and then move down to the next one on top of that pyramid scheme.