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"The Court has insisted on these minima with an amazing degree of orthodoxy: "Any other conclusion," the Court has warned, "would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts." n10"
Legal fiction rights (a group is an individual) traced to "standing" fictions: deception employed in the effort to gain absolute power:
"This apparent inconsistency in the application of the particularization requirement has led some commentators to ask whether there are some constitutional rights that are "group rights" and others that are "personal rights." n59 In Section VI, I suggest that this false dichotomy is an artifact of standing law, that it is out of sync with social reality, and that it is responsible for much of the perceived incoherence of standing doctrine."
All but the guilty are disenfranchised:
"All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision denying standing is "that the most injurious and widespread Governmental actions c[an] be questioned by nobody.""
"There is a developing body of work on human cognition which suggests that human thought is grounded in physical experience and extended by means of idealized cognitive models and metaphoric projections. n71 According to this theory, basic preconceptual experiences (or schema) provide the organizing principles for the construction of conceptual models. n72 Examples include link schema (such as the umbilical cord, hand holding); container schema (we experience our [*1385] bodies as having an in-out orientation); part-whole schema (we experience directly the relationships between our hands and the rest of the body); n73 and source-path-goal schema (from earliest childhood, we move from one place to another to obtain desired objects). n74 The human capacity to conceptualize allows us to project these structures and to use them to organize other aspects of our experience. To take a simple example, we conceptualize purposes in terms of the source-path-goal schema; this gives rise to systematic source-path-goal metaphors that we use in our thinking about purposes. We can therefore perceive our purposive efforts as going a long way toward our goal, conceptualize something or somebody that interferes with our purposes as an obstacle that gets in our way, and describe some of our failings in terms of being sidetracked. n75"
"There are analogous narrowing effects in the context of standing. When the metaphor of "standing" becomes the conduit of certain "truths," it structures our perception of the boundaries of the legal world in a way that is distorting. n95 The "standing" metaphor affects both how we perceive our past and what we receive from it in terms of available legal tools. n96 Viewed through the lens of "standing," adjudication was always about the settlement of private disputes; questions of public values are implicated only incidentally. But this was not always the case. At the time of the Framers, non-individualistic, group models of adjudication, like mandamus and informers' actions, had been designed to deal with public issues. n97 These public rights models were structured in terms of other schemata very much at odds with the modern conceptualization of standing. The "standing" metaphor, therefore, deprives us of a knowledge of our own history. As a result, we lose an understanding of what that history could say to us about our possibilities."
https://constitution.org/duepr/standing/winter_standing.htm
In that last quote are words that ought to be weighed in context of the following words from Roger Roots book The Conviction Factory:
Page 40
Private Prosecutors
"For decades before and after the Revolution, the adjudication of criminals in America was governed primarily by the rule of private prosecution: (1) victims of serious crimes approached a community grand jury, (2) the grand jury investigated the matter and issued an indictment only if it concluded that a crime should be charged, and (3) the victim himself or his representative (generally an attorney but sometimes a state attorney general) prosecuted the defendant before a petit jury of twelve men. Criminal actions were only a step away from civil actions - the only material difference being that criminal claims ostensibly involved an interest of the public at large as well as the victim. Private prosecutors acted under authority of the people and in the name of the state - but for their own vindication. The very term "prosecutor" meant criminal plaintiff and implied a private person. A government prosecutor was referred to as an attorney general and was a rare phenomenon in criminal cases at the time of the nation's {notice the affect of misrepresenting here, as there were 13 nations that were founded, not one: nation supplants federation, or profitable monopoly supplants voluntary association for mutual defense} founding. When a private individual prosecuted an action in the name of the state, the attorney general was required to allow the prosecutor to use his name - even if the attorney general himself did not approve of the action.
Private prosecution meant that criminal cases were for the most part limited by the need of crime victims for vindication. Crime victims held the keys to a potential defendant's fate and often negotiated the settlement of criminal cases. After a case was initiated in the name of the people, however, private prosecutors were prohibited from withdrawing the action pursuant to private agreement with the defendant. {plea-bargaining is voluntary when no other people are threatened by the offender, but involuntary when the potential for injury yet to be done by the offender is bought off by a private person, which then allows the offender to run amok in the playground} Court intervention was occasionally required to compel injured crime victims to appear against offenders in court and "not to make bargains to allow [defendants] to escape conviction, if they...repair the injury."
The Conviction Factory: The Collapse of America's Criminal Courts, Roger Roots, 2014
So...personal injury is repaired, but a threat to everyone is unaccounted for, thereby enabling that threat (giving license to) to move onto other victims. Modern Injustice fake government "courts" routinely extort confessions by threatening severe punishments under the guise (metaphor) of "plea bargaining," which thereby results in a private bargain, for private profit, at the expense of everyone: not the public thing, thereby not republican.
Returning to Winter writing about Standing, the following quote ought to be weighed in the context of Corporate Rights, as in "limited Liability" legal fiction, corporate personhood. In other words the "Courts" (so-called Article III summary justice "courts") assume the power to act as gatekeepers, and the routine for those in power is to deny access to due process on the grounds that there is no public thing (no republic) that can be injured, when in fact every single injury to every single individual is an injury to that public thing. And furthermore, while the one hand is waving this magic wand that disenfranchises all the slaves (everyone who produces anything worth stealing) from due process, the other hand is busy defending the all powerful nation state, with it's so-called National Interest. See for example the murder of Martin Luther King Jr.
"The very availability of these writs as means to control governmental action belies the private rights model; these procedural devices were designed to restrain unlawful or abusive action by lower courts or public agencies, especially actions that were beyond their jurisdiction. n125 These writs fit easily within the jurisprudential thought of the time. n126 As Blackstone explained it, mandamus and prohibition redressed the legal injuries of "refusal or neglect of justice" n127 and "encroachment of jurisdiction," n128 respectively. Neither of these concepts entails a view in which only individuals can be rights-holders. To the contrary, "neglect of justice" and "encroachment of jurisdiction" are essentially communal concerns. n129 And, if Blackstone's definitions of these "injuries" sound strange to modern ears, it is because today's jurisprudence treats "injury-in-fact" in literalist terms. But the common law usage of the term "injury" was plainly metaphoric. n130 The term "injury" referred to "any infringement of the rights of another ... for which an action lies at law." n131 Legal injuries were conceptualized in terms of the experience of physical injury, but the former was not confused with the latter. It is only in this sense that there could be a notion of damnum absque injuria — that is, damage without cognizable legal injury."
Reinforcing the private prosecutor process:
"The English relator practice, which applied also in equity, provided a formalized procedure for this part-whole metonymy. On issues of public rights or public duties, where the English attorney general could sue on behalf of the Crown, any person might seek one of the prerogative writs or bring a suit for an injunction in the name of the attorney general. The litigant, or relator, needed only to obtain the fiat or permission of the attorney general to use his name; such permission was [*1399] granted as a matter of course. Once permission was obtained, the relator prosecuted the action at his or her own expense and without direction from the attorney general. n136 The attorney general, however, was not a necessary party — that is, his fiat was not needed — "where the interference with the public right is at the same time an interference with some private right or is a breach of some statutory provision for the protection of the plaintiff." n137 This latter rule demonstrates that the relator practice clearly contemplated actions by those without a direct stake in the controversy. Thus, as a practical and historical matter, the relator's action extended the availability of judicial remedies to persons not immediately affected by the challenged action by allowing any part to invoke the name and the power of the whole and represent its interests before the courts."
Evidence of usurpation (treason against the public thing, treason against the whole people, treason against any individual as one part of the whole respublica) as the "Judiciary Act" 1789 is referenced:
"In Hayburn's Case, Attorney General Randolph filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of mandamus to the federal circuit court for Pennsylvania to enforce a congressional statute providing disability pensions to Revolutionary War veterans. n140 The statute empowered the federal circuit courts (which were the superior trial courts) to serve as commissions, determining the amount of the pensions and certifying those determinations to the secretary of war. The secretary of war, however, could disallow a pension and refer the case to Congress. The circuit courts refused to accept these cases.
The Attorney General first sought mandamus in his own behalf, ex officio, to enforce the statutory scheme. He argued that section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 n141 authorized the attorney general to act in this manner. n142 But, only a few months before the argument in Hayburn's Case, Congress had rejected an amendment to the Process Act of 1792, n143 proposed by Randolph, that would have explicitly authorized such actions. n144 A divided Court denied the ex officio motion. n145 Rayburn's [*1400] response was to seek mandamus on behalf of Hayburn, an interested party. n146"
Spelled out well enough perhaps in the following quote is this battle over who speaks for everyone, whereas a petit jury (trial by the country) is the ancient common law voice of the whole public, and expressly not a faction (oligarch) assuming (falsely) power to speak for, or act for, the whole, and certainly not an individual (king) assuming (criminally enforcing by treason) powers to speak for the whole number of individuals that constitute the public thing:
"But Hayburn's Case did not affect the viability of adjudicatory models premised on the part-whole schema — that is, it did not reflect a rejection of the English practice treating such cases as justiciable. Rather, the concern in Hayburn's Case was with the proper definition of the whole in a constitutional system of separated powers. The English practice upon which Randolph relied presupposed a sovereign with plenary power to enforce its laws through its attorney general and its courts. It was this premise that the Court did not accept. The executive was no longer the "head" of the body politic, and the federal courts, unlike the King's Bench, could no longer assume that they were free to speak for the whole. Rather, both organs were limited to the exercise of powers given either by the Constitution or, within constitutional limits, by the Congress. n148 Congress was the branch most representative of the American sovereign — the people. It was, therefore, the closest American equivalent to society's "head.""
And there it is the usurpation. Rather than the whole people (respublica) being represented in the petit jury (democratically selected by lot), the faction known as a "congress" assumes the power to speak for, and act for, the whole. Gone is trial by jury, gone is consent of the governed.
"Different institutional premises, rather than doubts about justiciability, led to the demise of the relator form of action in the federal courts. Indeed, Hayburn's Case affirmed another adjudicatory model premised on the part-whole schema. That is, if the Court had intended to require that plaintiffs must have personal injuries in order to establish [*1401] a "case or controversy," then it would have dismissed Randolph's ex officio action at the outset for want of justiciability. Similarly, it would have held the case unjusticiable even after Randolph declared that he was suing on behalf of another.
The Court did not dismiss Randolph's actions for lack of justiciability because it did not repudiate the essence of the public rights model. Today we would see Randolph's actions as an instance of jus tertii — raising the rights of third parties — or what I will call a representational model. The Hayburn Court accepted Randolph's invocation of a representational model, premised on a part-whole structure, that did not require allegation of specific, personal injury: Randolph, a representative of the whole, was allowed to proceed with the mandamus petition on behalf of Hayburn, a part. n149"
So what happened to the grand jury made up of people who are independent, not part of the government?
Furthermore, the question of who is more powerful, each individual at peace with each other individual represented by a petit jury, as the final say so on any matter of fact, law, or justice, or, on the contrary, a band of deceiving criminals falsely assuming absolute authority on anything, is...
The whole country where each is as powerful as each other:
"Although Hayburn's Case undermined the institutional premises of the relator action, American courts continued to entertain similar suits premised on a part-whole schema. Those courts familiar with the English precedents invoked them to allow citizens without particularized injury or interest to question governmental authority. In State v. Justices of Middlesex, n150 the New Jersey Supreme Court invoked the theory that jurisdiction lay to redress what Blackstone called "neglect of justice" n151 to hold that certiorari was available to challenge the conduct of an election. The court found support for its conclusion in the writings of the English jurists, including Coke n152 and Hawkins, who observed that "whatever crime is manifestly against the publick good, it comes within the conusance of this court [the King's Bench], though it do not directly injure any particular person...." n153 The New Jersey court indicated that its discretionary power of certiorari "is sometimes exercised before an injury actually accrues to any one, by issuing a mandamus...." n154 The Court justified this power in communitarian terms:
Where the injury is extensive, and involves any considerable portion of the community, it is better to take up the business in gross.... The reason is [that] the power is necessary for the preservation of the peace of the community; — and with what colour can it be pretended that this court, whose duty it emphatically is to take care that justice is done to [*1402] every one, has no power to protect the interests, and redress the wrongs of an entire county. n155"
Each is as powerful as each other overturned by a "higher" authority:
"Although Middlesex was apparently reversed on appeal..."
Much like the recent trial by jury case involving the Federal Reserve, whereby the judgment of the people, seconded by a judge, is over"RULED" by a summary justice court.
https://constitution.org/duepr/standing/winter_standing.htm