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| Joined: | Mon Nov 21st, 2005 |
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Where we part are now two accurately measurable things (actually processes):
1. Common Law according to your definition of it is the counterfeit version of common law when the actual process described in history (Trial by Jury described it well enough for practical purposes, but there are more descriptions elsewhere) is compared to your amoral (which usually helps hide the immorality) description of "what is" in history after the counterfeiting was done.
That is one place were my study and your study parts ways, and that is very significant because you move on, as if the original, organic, moral, common law did not exist, dose not exist, and will not exist, as you hold fast to your counterfeit version of common law, as if you have a use for fraudulent processes.
2. Contacting other people, in your view, can be a waste of time. I get that from this:
"For myself, it is that I spend too much time reading, and regret when I have to consider dumping hours of reading time as worthless."
My viewpoint is not that viewpoint. At the very least there is worth in knowing how people are turned from morality to immorality in time and place, even if the same path was taken by each one each time, there is worth in something called reinforcement. If only 1 person takes that path from morality to immorality, a path they were targeted into, a path like a mouse trap with deception like cheese luring people into it, then that is a reinforcement of 1, where one example of the process is worth knowing. A second example adds reinforcement to the understanding, knowledge, of the process, as each path is slightly different, adding more evidence, more information, so as to build a comprehensive perspective of the process by which deception is used to lure innocent people along a path from morality to immorality.
I read much (but not all) of the information you posted, and linked, on this public access forum, and I appreciate that effort on your part. The problem here is spelled out to you, offered to you, for you to either understand, to know, or to find fault with it, and then offer back to me a reason why my perspective is flawed.
Common law was, is, and can always be merely the process by which people reach for their voluntary mutual defense, a power so great as to deter all crimes that can be deterred by a human process. To claim that it was not done the way it was done, if that is your claim, is lacking any evidence that works to counter the existing evidence already offered just in this forum topic alone, let alone the volumes of evidence I've uncovered so far, and let alone the volumes of evidence other people have uncovered on their independent efforts to study the subject matter.
Common law is not, was not, and does not have to be a dictatorial edict issued by a select few of disturbed, criminal, gangs, whereby said gangs of criminals determine whatever they wish to do to everyone else, whenever it pleases them to do so, because they have managed to gain that power by criminal means: which is the common law you describe, which was moved from the original, organic, moral common law, to the counterfeit, criminal, immoral common law over a long period of time, as documented in the examples offered in both English History and American History.
Magna Carta offers an example of incuplatory evidence proving the fact that the criminal version of law existed separate from something called the common law, all of which is well explained in the Essay Trial by Jury by Lysander Spooner, but the inculpatory evidence is right there in the "official" (criminal) document called Magna Carta.
Common law (the organic, grassroots, original, as described in Magna Carta, Jefferson's notes on Virginia, the first Congress of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, court cases in between 1775 and 1789 such as the 2 Respublica cases already cited, and the Bill of Rights which were supposed to have been Amendments to the fraudulent - criminal - Constitution of 1789), that common law, is a power commanded by all the people all the time for mutual defense of all the people all the time wherever, and whenever, people volunteer to use that process by which anyone is subject to accusation and trial by jury, which was, is, and can be, trial by the country.
You offer:
"It is not. Simply because there is no courtroom large enough to keep the whole nation in to deliberate."
What is that above? That above appears to be an answer followed by evidence proving (beyond reasonable doubt?) the answer offered by you, and I am, or the next guy is, or the next lady is, and we all are, supposed to be convinced by your evidence?
Is your refutation supposed to refute the following?
It is fairly presumable that such a tribunal will agree to no conviction except such as substantially the whole country would agree to, if they were present, taking part in the trial. A trial by such a tribunal is, therefore, in effect, "a trial by the country." In its results it probably comes as near to a trial by the whole country, as any trial that it is practicable to have, without too great inconvenience and expense. And. as unanimity is required for a conviction, it follows that no one can be convicted, except for the violation of such laws as substantially the whole country wish to have maintained. The government can enforce none of its laws, (by punishing offenders, through the verdicts of juries,) except such as substantially the whole people wish to have enforced. The government, therefore, consistently with the trial by jury, can exercise no powers over the people, (or, what is the same thing, over the accused person, who represents the rights of the people,) except such as substantially the whole people of the country consent that it may exercise. In such a trial, therefore, "the country," or the people, judge of and determine their own liberties against the government, instead of the government's judging of and determining its own powers over the people.
At the time (1852) the above was written the place known as America was moving from a time when the Central Banking (criminal) Power was at a low point after Jackson pulled the plug on the Second Bank of the United States, and an age of Wild Cat Banking (competition in money markets) began, and began to work as (moral) competition works, to increase the quality of goods offered by competitors, and decrease the price of goods offered by competitors.
At that time, when Lysander Spooner wrote Trial by Jury, the same author was writing the work known as A New System of Paper Currency.
https://archive.org/details/newsystemofpaper01spoo
The same author also wrote No Treason:
http://praxeology.net/LS-NT-6.htm
At that time, in America, Josiah Warren wrote Equitable Commerce:
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_Archives/bright/warren/equcom.pdf
And the same author wrote True Civilization:
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/warren/truecivtoc.html
At around the same time Stephen Pearl Andrews wrote The Science of Society:
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/andrews/scienceofsociety.pdf
And at about the same time Benjamin Tucker wrote the following:
First in the importance of its evil influence they considered the money monopoly, which consists of the privilege given by the government to certain individuals, or to individuals holding certain kinds of property, of issuing the circulating medium, a privilege which is now enforced in this country by a national tax of ten per cent., upon all other persons who attempt to furnish a circulating medium, and by State laws making it a criminal offense to issue notes as currency. It is claimed that the holders of this privilege control the rate of interest, the rate of rent of houses and buildings, and the prices of goods, – the first directly, and the second and third indirectly. For, say Proudhon and Warren, if the business of banking were made free to all, more and more persons would enter into it until the competition should become sharp enough to reduce the price of lending money to the labor cost, which statistics show to be less than three-fourths of once per cent. In that case the thousands of people who are now deterred from going into business by the ruinously high rates which they must pay for capital with which to start and carry on business will find their difficulties removed. If they have property which they do not desire to convert into money by sale, a bank will take it as collateral for a loan of a certain proportion of its market value at less than one per cent. discount. If they have no property, but are industrious, honest, and capable, they will generally be able to get their individual notes endorsed by a sufficient number of known and solvent parties; and on such business paper they will be able to get a loan at a bank on similarly favorable terms. Thus interest will fall at a blow. The banks will really not be lending capital at all, but will be doing business on the capital of their customers, the business consisting in an exchange of the known and widely available credits of the banks for the unknown and unavailable, but equality good, credits of the customers and a charge therefor of less than one per cent., not as interest for the use of capital, but as pay for the labor of running the banks. This facility of acquiring capital will give an unheard of impetus to business, and consequently create an unprecedented demand for labor, – a demand which will always be in excess of the supply, directly to the contrary of the present condition of the labor market. Then will be seen an exemplification of the words of Richard Cobden that, when two laborers are after one employer, wages fall, but when two employers are after one laborer, wages rise. Labor will then be in a position to dictate its wages, and will thus secure its natural wage, its entire product. Thus the same blow that strikes interest down will send wages up. But this is not all. Down will go profits also. For merchants, instead of buying at high prices on credit, will borrow money of the banks at less than one per cent., buy at low prices for cash, and correspondingly reduce the prices of their goods to their customers. And with the rest will go house-rent. For no one who can borrow capital at one per cent. with which to build a house of his own will consent to pay rent to a landlord at a higher rate than that. Such is the vast claim made by Proudhon and Warren as to the results of the simple abolition of the money monopoly.
The so called Civil War followed the age in America where Liberty was gaining power as people were able to fight back against the large volume of falsehood caused by the 1789 USURPATION of the federation under the common law that was started in 1775, to be usurped in 1789.
So, all that above, all that information that contributes to my understanding of the comprehensive picture of what is now, and what was then, is refuted by your claim of authority of the truth? This:
It is not. Simply because there is no courtroom large enough to keep the whole nation in to deliberate.
How does that, above, address the following?
It is fairly presumable that such a tribunal will agree to no conviction except such as substantially the whole country would agree to, if they were present, taking part in the trial. A trial by such a tribunal is, therefore, in effect, "a trial by the country." In its results it probably comes as near to a trial by the whole country, as any trial that it is practicable to have, without too great inconvenience and expense. And. as unanimity is required for a conviction, it follows that no one can be convicted, except for the violation of such laws as substantially the whole country wish to have maintained. The government can enforce none of its laws, (by punishing offenders, through the verdicts of juries,) except such as substantially the whole people wish to have enforced. The government, therefore, consistently with the trial by jury, can exercise no powers over the people, (or, what is the same thing, over the accused person, who represents the rights of the people,) except such as substantially the whole people of the country consent that it may exercise. In such a trial, therefore, "the country," or the people, judge of and determine their own liberties against the government, instead of the government's judging of and determining its own powers over the people.
In practical modern terms follows a scenario offered for consideration to anyone, anywhere, on Earth.
Accuser Jane Doe accuses accused John Smith of a crime against Jane Doe. If the accusation is false, willfully false, with malice aforethought, then Jane Doe is the criminal, and John Smith is innocent, until proven guilty, and common law, if it is moral, does not allow John Smith to be injured by Jane Doe, as Jane Doe gains access to common law.
In common law, if common law were to return to America, the accuser has as much access to Rule of Law (common law) as everyone else, and the point of contact most necessary, in this and every other case, is the one individual that Jane Doe has free access to contact, and deliver the official accusation at common law to this one individual working, volunteering, in common law.
Who is that individual contacted by Jane Doe and what authority, what power, what jurisdiction does this individual who receives the official accusation command?
The answer is none, or all, depending upon who the individual is, in fact.
Now is a good time to quote Thomas Jefferson for some clue as to how common law works when common law works for all, for the defense of all, against any harm done by an individual, or harm done by an individual conspiring with other individuals: a group conspiring to threaten harm to individuals.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jeffvir.asp
The state is divided into counties. In every county are appointed magistrates, called justices of the peace, usually from eight to thirty or forty in number, in proportion to the size of the county, of the most discreet and honest inhabitants. They are nominated by their fellows, but commissioned by the governor, and act without reward.
These magistrates have jurisdiction both criminal and civil.
If the question before them be a question of law only, they decide on it themselves: but if it be of fact, or of fact and law combined, it must be referred to a jury. In the latter case, of a combination of law and fact, it is usual for the jurors to decide the fact, and to refer the law arising on it to the decision of the judges. But this division of the subject lies with their discretion only. And if the question relate to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in which the judges may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide both law and fact. If they be mistaken, a decision against right, which is casual only, is less dangerous to the state, and less afflicting to the loser, than one which makes part of a regular and uniform system. In truth, it is better to toss up cross and pile in a cause, than to refer it to a judge whose mind is warped by any motive whatever, in that particular case. But the common sense of twelve honest men gives still a better chance of just decision, than the hazard of cross and pile. These judges execute their process by the sheriff or coroner of the county, or by constables of their own appointment. If any free person commit an offence against the commonwealth, if it be below the degree of felony, he is bound by a justice to appear before their court, to answer it on indictment or information. If it amount to felony, he is committed to jail, a court of these justices is called; if they on examination think him guilty, they send him to the jail of the general court, before which court he is to be tried first by a grand jury of 24, of whom 13 must concur in opinion: if they find him guilty, he is then tried by a jury of 12 men of the county where the offence was committed, and by their verdict, which must be unanimous, he is acquitted or condemned without appeal.