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Varyag
No stone, no cross can tell where they died
For the glory of Russian flag
Only sea waves will forever celebrate
The heroic death of “Varyag”!
(original verse by E. Studentskaya)
In the night between 26th and 27th of January 1904 without declaration of war Japanese navy attacked Russian Pacific flee outside Port Arthur. Ten torpedo-boats shot their Whitehead torpedoes. Out of 16 torpedoes only 3 found their targets, heavily damaging ironclads “Tsesarevich” and “Retvizan”. Cruiser “Pallada” was also damaged. The defeat of Russian Arms in Russo-Japanese war is incomprehensible without understanding of history behind it. Which calls upon setting to rest certain myths distorting reality.
Myths start from the very first minutes of war. For example, there is a statement about almighty Japanese military intelligence coverage in the Far East. There was of course Japanese military intelligence. Due to racial familiarity Japanese didn’t have too much trouble posing as Chinese workers. For instance, at the head of Port Arthur’s night-cart, on top of a barrel with excrements, traveled a colonel from Japanese General Staff.
Yet the intelligence received by admiral Togo wasn’t exactly the highest quality. Second squad of torpedo-boats instead of Port Arthur attacked ports of Dal’niy and Talienvan, which didn’t have any Russian military units. If Togo had proper information, initial attack could turn out as total devastation. Japanese military intelligence wasn’t decisively important in this war.
Other myth – one saying that right before the attack most of Russian ranked military officers weren't present on ships, rather being on name-day celebration dedicated to the admiral Stark’s wife – originated from Russian newspapers of 1904, created by writer Stepanov. It’s worth to note that concerning everything else two-volume edition of “Port-Arthur” by him is not only an interesting book, but also a quite accurate chronicle of historical events.
Aforementioned name-day party was actually postponed. At that time flagship hosted counsel about military maneuvers, scheduled for the next day. All armaments, except for the main gun were loaded and ready to fire. Woken up by starting shots crews not only repelled the vile attack of the Japanese, but managed to save all three damaged vessels using methodology designed by foremost navy theoretician admiral Makarov not long before the war. By the way, Makarov was one of those who cautioned about outside roadsteads. The day before Japanese attack he wrote:
“No kind of vigilance can stop vigorous adversary from sailing into our fleet with numerous torpedo-boats and even steam-launches. Result of such an attack will be very bad for us, because net fences doesn’t cover entire side and besides many of our ship don’t have them at all… Japanese won’t miss such a great chance to harm us… If we’re not going to place fleet in the interior Port Arthur area of water, we will be forced to do it after first night attack, paying dearly or our mistake.”
Parades and deck cleaning weren’t the only activities on the ship of imperial Russia, as it may seem to those reading modern writers with “historical” slant. Ship engineers along with the whole crew saved vessel from inevitable keel. Let’s note that in Sevastopol 1956 no such skill had shown itself when explosion happened on line ship “Novorossiysk”. Imperial navy had the best sea practice at the time. Any ship of Baltic fleet (from which Pacific fleet consisted) had to sail almost around the entire globe to get the new service area. Soviet navy received similar experience only in the late 70’s, leaving Baltic and Black seas.
Slander of the imperial navy was not a coincidence. It had a purpose of covering up the destruction of Russian naval tradition. One that wasn’t guzzled off in pubs, wasn’t sunk under Port Arthur and in Tsushima, but was executed on the bloody ice of rebel Helsingfors in February 1917.
Russian navy started full-scale preparations for war in March 1903, when admiral Stark ordered to change parade white color of ship into wartime khaki color. Nowadays all naval fleets in the world bear different shades of grey. But Russian ship were about to battle in Yellow Sea, which, being yellow from lifted clay ooze becomes blurry green the further you are from China’s shores. Russian ships were painted according to war seat. This was the first war in history of humankind where parade white color of ships was changed.
To dismantle yet another myth, let’s return to Saint-Petersburg. General opinion goes that Russian diplomats were doing nothing to (if not prevent) at least buy time before the war. That is in complete contradiction with historical reality. In the course of negotiations about Manchuria territorial conflicts with Japan, Russian ambassador in Tokyo was sent a telegram, authorizing additional acquiescence. Important to remind that radio, invented by Popov (and soon after – by Marconi), was in just first decade of its existence, so embassies didn’t have a direct independent communications lines with their governments. So Japanese telegraph workers had delayed that diplomatic message. Probably not without specific orders to do so. Japanese side used “not receiving an answer for their demands” as an excuse to sever diplomatic relation with Russia, immediately asking Russian ambassador baron Rosen to leave the country. This is how Japanese paper “Nizi-Nizi” expressed the public opinion:
“Beat and rout that wild horde, let our banner stand on the peaks of Ural”.
Let’s note that these events were 20 years prior to infamous “Mein Kampf” by Hitler. Forefathers of German geopolitical theory, like Haushofer, couldn’t even dream about something like that even in Hitler’s Germany.
As for barbaric ways… Modern society, that is being fed different samurai-related tell-tales through television, should remember, that main Japanese military code – Bushido – contains direct instructions of ritual cannibalism. Samurai-victor to ensure his victory should eat sushi out of defeated opponent’s liver.
Bushido code does obviously differ from Russian understanding of honor. Besides cannibalism, it also praises sudden assault on non-hostile enemy and even on neutral person. Whole code is basically soaked with aggressiveness:
“Because our country differs from others by the fact that even the worst of people – peasants, traders and artisans – possess old rusty swords, and in this manifests warrior spirit of the great Japanese Empire”.
(“Book of samurai, Bushido”)
After dressing up in European clothes and granting their samurai-cannibals European titles of counts and viscounts, Japan didn’t really try to immerse in the spirit of chivalry. Using the lack of long-distance radio on civil ships Japanese captured Russian steamship “Ekaterinoslav” 3 miles from Korean coast, near Tsushima. In Korean port Buzan (need to confirm spelling) they captured steamship “Mukden”. On the Nagasaki raid they capture steamships “Rossiya” and “Argun’”, all the while not letting captains to contact Russian consul service. Day after in Yellow Sea 100 miles from Port Arthur captured transport vessel “Mongoliya”. In the tragic coincidence that transport was delivering aeronautical sets in Port Arthur. Lack of these aerostats would half a year later prove detrimental for successful counter war battery gunning.
Next morning after the attack on Port Arthur Japanese attacked cruiser “Varyag” and gunboat “Koreyets” near Korean port of Chemulpo (more names to confirm). A lot can be said about failures of Russian steward in the Far East – admiral Alekseev, who didn’t call back ships guarding Russian diplomats. Yet vile deceit of the Japanese, who cut underwater telegraph line, that provided communication for Seoul with the outside world, was far beyond diplomatic customs at the time, which (as opposed to today) were followed inexorably.
Evening of 26th. “Koreyets” left port with the goal of delivering diplomatic mail and receiving further orders. At the bay exit ship was intercepted by Japanese squadron consisting of 6 cruisers and 8 torpedo-ships. Japanese blocked the gunboat and gave a sense that leaving is not an option, forcing Russian ship to turn back. When “Koreyets” turned it was immediately attacked by torpedo-boats. Ship’s captain, second rank captain Belyaev, managed to evade Japanese torpedoes and get back to Chemulpo.
Today it’s popular to speculate what captain of “Varyag” – Rudnev – should have done. Some say that he should have tried a night breakthrough, leaving slow “Koreyets” to a certain death. But in reality situation was much more complicated. It is time to get rid of another persistent myth saying that “Varyag” was the best cruiser of Port Arthur’s squadron. Built on American wharf “Kramp and sons” (need to confirm spelling) truly beautiful cruiser had a factory defect – its steam chambers had a serious constructive drawbacks – they couldn’t keep high pressure, necessary full speed movement. Russia didn’t have sufficient service base in the Far East. Defect could be remedied on in Philadelphia, where ship was built, or in Kronstadt (near Saint-Petersburg). At that last evening the ship couldn’t go faster than 17 knots. Also, port of Chemulpo was shoal and with quite narrow and twisty fairway. Even with a full tide exit was very intricate. Rudnev didn’t make mistakes. His ship was faulty, thin fairway didn’t leave any room to maneuver around Japanese cruiser squadron. Rudnev made the decision. Decision which was the only one possible for a Russian ranked officer, which was baneful for the ship and the crew, but vital for Russian honor:
“We are going for a breakthrough and going to battle with enemy’s squadron, no matter how strong it is. We will not give away the ships and we will fight as long as we can and to the last drop of blood”.
Morning, 11:30, 27th of January. “Varyag” and “Koreyets” unmoor. When they were on their way to the certain death and passed by stationed European ships, orchestras of those ships played the Russian anthem. “Varyag” was about to meet cruiser squadron under the command of admiral Uriu (confirm spelling), while just enemy’s flagship – cruiser “Asama”, armed with 8-inch tower cannons, was substantially superior to Russian ship in terms of firepower. And beside “Asama” there were at least 5 cruisers no less powerful than “Varyag”.
11:45. “Asama” is the first to open fire due to superior range. Artillery of Russian cruiser took its turn when distance was close enough. First victim of the battle was warrant-officer count Alexei Nirod, who was manning the range-finder. Japanese shell hit him in the chest. Severed hand with family ring was found after the battle.
Brutal fight went on for 45 minutes. Out of 557 men in the crew 31 was killed and 190 injured. Cruiser made 1105 shots, went through almost all its ammunition. Many of its armaments were destroyed. “Varyag” could not continue to keep the rate of fire so Rudnev ordered to fall back to the port. Because cruiser could no longer fight, it was deliberately sunk. Gunboat “Koreyets” was blown up. Russian steamship “Sungari” was also sunk. Russian crews were sheltered on stationed ship of neutral countries. Only American ship refused to help. Captain of the French cruiser “Pascal” made sure that badly injured Russian sailors got help in Japanese hospital of Red Cross.
To the credit of Japanese – this time they acted chivalrous. Impressed by fortitude of Russian sailors admiral Uriu ordered to consider them shipwreck castaways instead of POWs. Such nobility happened for the first and the last time in Japanese history.
Heroic deed of “Varyag” made an impression not only in Russia, but also around the world. Few remember that original song “Varyag” was composed by German poet Rudolf Greintz (need to confirm spelling).
In March heroic crews arrived in Odessa. Their railway trip to Saint-Petersburg was more like a triumphant parade with exceptional meeting in the capital in the end. 16th of April crews paraded on Nevskiy Prospekt and received an audience in Zimniy Dvorets (“Winter Palace”, residence of the emperor Nikolai II). On the banquet in honor of heroes of Chemulpo emperor said this:
“Many of you by your blood added to the chronicles of our navy the deed worthy of the deeds of your ancestors – grandfathers and fathers, which were accomplished by them on “Azov” and “Merkuriy”. Now you by your deed added a new chapter to the history of our navy, joining in the names of “Varyag” and “Koreyets”.
In the meantime, war continued. First order of business for Japanese was total naval domination. For that purpose they carried out a series of night attacks with steam-branders, which were supposed to be deliberately sunk in Port Arthur bay chokepoint. But Russian ships and coastal artillery repelled all such attempts. Yet Russian fleet didn’t make any active moves. Concerned by the situation, emperor makes a brilliant decision – duties of the commander of the Pacific fleet have a new bearer - vice-admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov. Brave ranked officer, awarded with Cross of Saint Georg for Balkan war, peerless war theoretician, who became the founder of new ship classes – torpedo-boats and mosquito-crafts, shipbuilder and polar researcher, creator of the first ever line icebreaker “Yermak”, creator of the so-called ‘theory of insinkability’ of a ship. In other words – there was no better candidate.
Besides that, admiral Makarov invented new caps for armor-piercers (“Makarov’s caps”), which unfortunately were never implemented in Russian navy, despite actually improving piercing ability by 10-16%. These nosepieces were caps of non-alloyed steel, which collapsed on hit at the same time forcing outside solid layer of armor to crack. After that thick main piece of a shell could easily penetrate inner layers – ones much weaker than the outer layer. 6-inch shells with such caps could go through 254 mm of armor (with straight shot). It’s obvious that implementation of such modifications would dramatically change the course of war: for once, “Varyag” would be able break through armor of “Asama”. Makarov made many suggestions regarding overall fleet modifications, but just a few of them were eventually approved and/or taken into account.
Under Makarov’s banner Russian ironclads learned to do the impossible – to leave bay through shoal narrow exit within one tide and without a tow. Gunners on Russian ironclads did their work considerably better than their Japanese opponents. Makarov was preparing the fleet for the main battle. Only thing that made him wait were initially damaged ship undergoing repairs.
Port Arthur didn’t have a dry-dock that could accommodate a heavy ironclad. Russian historians, filled with communistic russophobic choler, like to blame the emperor himself for that. Important to remember that dry-dock is an expensive infrastructure. For instance, heavy ships of Soviet and now Russian fleet don’t use dry-docks still. Yet towing a floating dock from Saint-Petersburg to the Far East is impossible even in modern conditions. So Russian engineers found a way – they created custom coffers, allowing to work with underwater shell-holes.
Russian torpedo-boats were leaving port regularly to scout the opposition. In one such case counter-torpedo-boat “Steregushiy” went into fight with 4 Japanese torpedo-boats and met its heroic end, without ever lowering the flag.
In the cold morning 31st of Masch deed was repeated by torpedo-boat “Strashnyi”, which was attacked by 6 Japanese torpedo-boat-interceptors. Unfortunately its death server as prologue for the event much more tragic for fates of war and Pacific fleet. Cruiser “Bayan” spotted the conflict and sailed to assist. It scared away Japanese torpedo-boats and managed to grab 5 survivors, but at this point was already under fire itself. Cruiser fell back.
9:43. Flagship – ironclad “Petropavlovsk” was shaken by two consecutive huge explosions. Ironclad’s nose fell off and sunk. Great admiral has perished. Along with Makarov cold waters consumed his friend artist Vereshagin, counter-admiral Molas, 27 ranked officers and 630 sailors. But great duke Kirill Vladimirovich was spared the same fate. Only to later betray the emperor in March 1917 by forfeiting crew of guardian ship to temporary government. And to become an ancestor of the current supposed prince – Georgiy Hogenzollern.
Makarov’s death was not taken lightly by the emperor, who rarely shown much emotion in his diary:
“Terrible and incredibly sad news… Whole day couldn’t recollect myself from this horrible disaster.”
After Makarov’s death Japanese found themselves to be in the superior naval position. Today many seem to praise Japanese intelligence for these explosions. Yet the situation itself suggests coincidence rather than anything else. Running into a whole bunch of mines at the same time is entirely unlikely to be planned ahead. Sea – is not a road, not a railway. And Russian admiral was anything but predictable. Moving out on heavy ironclad was more like an exception rather than rule, because Makarov generally used fast ships like “Bayan” and “Novik”. That mine is unlikely to be a brilliant Japanese plan, rather it was an extremely unlucky circumstance.
Russian liberals dreamt about loss in Russo-Japanese war, because they wanted to end the monarchy. Any tactical defeat was cheered on.
At the start of April not long after Makarov’s death, first Japanese army under the command of general Kuroki, lands near Chemulpo. They move north to meet Russian troops. Russian soldiers will cover themselves with glory, but Russian command will make mistakes that defy logic. Lenin’s words about surrender of Port Arthur as beginning of the end for monarchy will not be random. But it will not be just the end of monarchy – it will be the end of Russian sovereignty.
Port Arthur
“Story about the siege of Port Arthur is, from start to finish, a tragedy of Japanese arms. Nothing special or even notable neither in terms of strategy, nor in terms of art of war was put on the table by Japanese”.
(English correspondent Ellis Bartlett (re-translation of the words, also need to confirm spelling))
Why are we time and time again going back to the war that Russian ‘educated’ social group tried not to notice even when the war was ongoing. No, we don’t try to remember the war. We try to remember Russia, memories of which were purposefully and consciously erased from minds of our fathers and grandfathers. We’re not doing this for the sake of collapsed graves of the past century. We’re doing this for the future, because it won’t grow from some past reality, but from a past as we understand it.
We were forced to be ashamed of our own name. We were told that our history consists of only failures. But it is time to try and look objectively about our defeats; and (what is more important) see not just the shadow, but also the untold light of our history.
After Makarov’s death Japanese fleet immediately achieved so long-desired naval dominance. After landing forces in Chemulpo, Japanese moved north, followed by an entire army of carriers. 26th of April marked the first battle overland on the Yalu river. 20-thousand Russian cover unit retreated under suppression from 40-thousand army under the command of General Oku. In the middle of May railway branch connecting Port Arthur with Russia was cut off. Siege of the fortress began.
Port Arthur is a Chinese fortress Lushun. It was named “Port Arthur” on European maps in times of “opium wars” in honor of English captain Arthur Eliot, who “opened” Lushun for Europe. Port Arthur was captured by Japan in 1895. Then it was returned to China by the demand of Russia, Germany and France. Finally it was rented for 25 years by Russia in 1900.
Being in a complete blockade from the outside world Port Arthur was held for 7 months against an enemy that should not be underestimated. Losing 11 thousand men fortress garrison inflicted 112 thousand casualties to the army of general Nogi. Ratio is more than respectable.
General Nogi, ashamed by (in his own opinion) unjustified human and supply losses, was about to perform hara-kiri. But emperor forbade him to do that. After emperor’s death, Nogi (with his wife) eventually followed through with his intent.
Tendency to underestimate Japanese was not a new. It existed before the war and not only in Russia. It is based on a perception of a person’s height as the deciding factor in calculating possible threat. Naturally, average height of a European surpasses the average height of a south-east Asian. But we have to remember that in 1840s Colonel Colt had more or less evened the odds. So Japanese were a real and potent threat.
Autumn 1914. Japanese take German base in China (just a 100 miles from Port Arthur) – port and fortress of Qingdao – with minimal losses. Garrison surrenders not even waiting for an assault. And those are not some questionable Romanian or Italian troops. Those are soldiers of reichsvera – best army in Europe, army of German Kaiser Wilhelm II. Best in the world, physically strong and well-trained German infantry surrenders their arms to the dusty boots of short soldiers of Japanese Mikado.
German garrison in time of 3-month long siege lost 187 people. Japanese-English sieging corps lost a little over 300.
Russian garrison had to fight alone. Communication with the outside world was limited by month old newspapers, provided by Chinese sailor on small boats who risked their lives for their own greed. These were the hopeless conditions Port Arthur found itself in.
From ideological point of view, for the sake of belittling the heroism of Russian soldiers, defense of Port Arthur was often branded as shameful capitulation before all the possible resistance was given. By we know very well that fortress commander general Anatoly Stessel did it against the will of the troops. Let’s not forget also, that war wasn’t fought under Moscow, and not under Leningrad, but in far away Manchuria.
And let’s not forget the great casualties’ ratio in Port Arthur. It wasn’t a wonder that emperor Nikolai II ordered to count every month of that siege as a year of service.
With all that one factor should be expressly noted. In many a cases there was a specific lack of effort from assigned Russian military commanders. In fact it seemed like the war was fought by low ranked officers and the people themselves. People who probably didn’t understand the vital significance of the Chinese railway and port for the state.
Lack of effort from new admiral Wilhelm Witheft was no short of absurd. I t seemed like his will was completely paralyzed, Russian ironclads were stuck in Port Arthur’s bay. Yet despite the lack of command Russian sailors made some serious progress. Japanese admiral Toga noticed the “dead zone” in the line of fire of Russian coastal artillery. During entire month of April his ships approached the fortress and bombarded it over the local mountain. Captain of a supply ship Fedor Ivanov realized that Toga for the sake of convenience always uses the same course for these attacks.
In the night between 1st and 2nd of May minelayer “Amur”, first ever ship able to lay anchor sea mines at while moving at full speed, built in Saint-Petersburg (and became the prototype for ship of foreign nations, which appeared only after the war), laid mines on the path of the Japanese. Next morning two newest Japanese ironclads “Yasima” and “Hatsuse” fell victims of those mines. “Hatsuse”’s amoo detonated and the ironclad immediately sunk with entire crew. “Yasima” managed to hold together for a little bit and sunk on its way back to Japan. But that’s not all. Failing to maneuver, cruiser “Kosuga” rammed the light cruiser “Eosino”. “Eosino” keeled over and sunk with almost entire crew. That event stopped naval bombardments of Port Arthur up until the end of siege. That was a considerable victory of Russian arms.
While at it Japanese started shooting in the water wildly. They thought that they are attacked by submarines. Their fears were not completely misplaced. Japanese knew that Russian fleet has a submarine division. This division of newly built and purchased little submarines was transport to pacific by the means of railway just before the war. Yet they weren’t there in time for Port Arthur. But already under the siege engineer Naletov managed to construct a little submarine from things lying around. 10 years after that Naletov will make a history by creating the first ever submarine minelayer “Crab”. In time of the World War I mines laid by “Crab” in Bosphorus will nullify the threat of German submarines in Black Sea.
Vladivostok was covered by an entire submarine fleet. While completely defenseless from land, city was protected from sea assault. 16th of April submarine “Som” while on patrol on the way to Zolotoy Rog bay discovered a group of Japanese torpedo-boats. Submarine’s captain – duke Trubetskoy ordered an attack. That was a first known attempt to attack a moving target by a submarine in an open sea.
It’s time to look into another persistent myth created by Soviet scientists. Imperial Russia is generally regarded as being a technologically weak state. Well, we weren’t weak in construction of absolutely new military vessels and weapons (such was submarines at the time), in fact Russia was more advanced in this field than others. So maybe we should try and view the situation from the other perspective.
In reality Russia wasn’t technologically weak, she was weak monetarily (not rich enough). Nowadays we justifiably consider oil and gas as Russia’s natural treasures. At the beginning of 20th century the main source for export was bread. Oil didn’t yet have the decisive economic value. Oil civilization was just starting. Coal was the primary source of power, lubricants were made out of banal sunflower, and gasoline automobiles were having a hard time finding their place.
There is also a moral factor in Russia’s lack of comparable wealth at the time. Let’s remember how major wealth of world’s empires was accumulated back then. They acquired their capital from blatant robbery of their colonies. Relatively small England built its fleet on account of its huge colonies, starting with India, whom English themselves called a pearl of English crown, and justifiably so. Almost free Indian cotton was sent to England to come back to India as expensive English manufactured goods.
In 20s-30s Japan will prove a great pupil to such colonial English experience in China. But at the start of 20th century Japan is much closer to primitive predatory. Its shining new ironclads, participating in warfare against Russia in fleet of admiral Toga, are built on the money stolen by Japanese soldiers from Chinese imperial silver treasury after suppressing so-called “boxer rebellion”. Let’s specifically note that these assets weren’t paid as reparations, but rather stolen in process of doing something which is nowadays called international aid or peacekeeping operations.
In contrast to British Empire Russia was a humane state not just in words. Russian monarch couldn’t allow a robbery of his subjects in Middle Asia or Caucasian region just because. “Prison of nations”, as Russian ‘educated class’ liked to call it, employed a measured and cogent national policy. Russian emperor lacked funds but he didn’t start robbing defenseless neighbors even when his troops were within a rifle shot distance from unprotected China’s treasury. And he didn’t put a burden of war expenses on the populace either.
Emperor often personally made trips to see troops off to war, considering it to be his duty. He also visited wharfs, where new ships for Pacific fleet were being constructed. New minister of finances V. N. Kokovtsov (appointed in first days of war) successfully managed outside load on French and German markets to cover for military expenses and by this keeping free exchange of banknotes for gold.
Thanks to this Russia population grew more than 1.5 times throughout the time of Nikolai II’s rule. Low taxes resulted in the highest industrial development rate in the world at the time. By 1920 (by foreign expert’s account) Russia was supposed to overcome USA in GDP value.
To describe alleged industrial weakness of Imperial Russia it’s often being put in contrast to Soviet industrial breakthroughs. But in actuality there wasn’t anything completely new in Soviet industrial approach. In fact, just as British crown flourished on robbing China and India, USSR to certain extent used the same ‘technique’. Only difference was that in was Russian core nation that got the sharp end of the stick to somebody else’s benefit, not the other way around.
When after 7-month siege Port Arthur is destined to fall, famous Russophobe Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) notes in his article:
”Capitulation of Port Arthur is a prologue to capitulation of monarchy”.
Seeming paradox of the time was that Russian people were free people. The only serious ‘bound’ in their lives was conscience. Ironically, ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ ideas running rampant in the West were used to ‘liberate’ people from conscience. Looking at things from this angle it is not difficult to see the purpose behind many political events concerning Russia starting from summer of 1905. Spread of such ‘freedom’ is the only actual victory that was gained against Russia.
There is yet another persistent myth saying that Russian army in Russo-Japanese war was suffering defeats one after another. In reality except for failures under Turenchen (confirm spelling) and in maneuvering on Shah River Russian army suffered no defeats. Casualties were way lower than Japanese. In decisive battles under Laojan (confirm spelling) and Mukden Russian army won defense phases, not only withstanding overwhelming numbers, but also inflicting casualties with 2 to 3 ratio in Russian favor. Yet every time Japanese field office prepared for retreat, general Kuropatkin will do the same simultaneously, effectively compromising Russian military efforts.
Same happened on the sea. There is another myth here. Main defeat of the Russian navy, deciding the course of the war, was not Tsushima. Main defeat was attempt to breakthrough from Port Arthur to Vladivostok by first Pacific squadron and the resulting battle in Yellow sea 28th of July. This attempt will make the move of second squadron unnecessary and Tsushima – almost inevitable.
Astonishingly enough, this battle, same as Laojan and Mukden, was effectively won despite the poor effort of squadron commanders. In the middle of the battle admiral Wilhelm Witgeft, who was situated on the open bridge of the flagship ironclad “Tsesarevich” was killed by direct hit of 420-kilogramm high-explosive shell. Then ironclad captain Nikolai Ivanov, breaking all possible protocols, doesn’t report admiral’s death, continuing the move to breakthrough. Russian gunners shoot much better than Japanese and admiral Togo signals retreat from the flagship “Mikasa”. That could become the turning point.
Yet the fate of the Russian squadron was decided by one single shell that blew up near deck-house of “Tsesarevich”. Shell’s fragments killed everybody inside. Dying helmsman falling on the helm as if intentionally sets the ship on the ramming course. This attack is supported by another ironclad – “Retvizan” and its captain – Shesnovich. But as soon as Ivanov falls injured, flag of the long-dead admiral is brought down. And new admiral duke Uhtomskiy immediately signals retreat to Port Arthur.
Cruiser commander Reitsenstein refuses to obey that order and continues with the breakthrough, effectively going through Japanese. Rst of the squadron comes back to Prot Arthur to later die under Japanese siege artillery.
Later there will be a capitulation of Port Arthur. Later there will be inevitable catastrophe at Tsushima. Yet neither of these affected the outcome of the war. Japanese ships simply weren’t able to attack Trans-Siberian railway, geopolitical instrument, a communication line used to date.
Port Arthur will survive 4 lengthy and vicious assaults. Here, likewise on the sea, Russian soldiers will fight despite inexplicable lack of effort from general Stessel. They will find themselves another leader. Soul of the garrison will be commander of one of rifle divisions – Roman Isidorovich Kondratenko.
Port Arthur defenders will fight with resourcefulness. Navy ranked officer Podgurskiy will use naval weapon on land. This will go down as prototype of mortar (minethrower). Women of Port Arthur will give away their silk to make cover for aerostat, much needed for aiming.
Studying Russo-Japanese war one can note that in many occasions the deciding factor in battles was morale or technical capabilities but rather pure luck. One mine decided the fate of admiral Makarov. One shell decided the fate of ironclad in Yellow Sea. Fate of Port Arthur was decided by one shell that broke concrete arch of fort №2 2nd of December 1904. This shell killed Roman Isidorovich Kondratenko. After his death command returned to general Anatoly Stessel. But even after losing their commander defenders will hold the line against the final Japanese assault. It was the last because after it Japanese commander Nogi, unable to beat Russian army in battle, decided to switch to blockade to starve them to death. But 19th of December general Stessel will yield the fortress despite the will of military council, despite the resolve of soldiers and ranked officers of the garrison.
At the time of Russo-Japanese war Lenin and his company stood for defeat of Russia. They did the same during World War I to use such a defeat to start a civil war.
General opinion considers voicing conspiracy theories to be a sign of bad manners. But the truth of the matter is that even in 1905 Lenin and his company did everything they could to sabotage Russia.
Former minister of finances Vitte was of the similar opinion:
”As politician I’m afraid of quick and brilliant successes of the Russians; it could have made leaders in Saint-Petersburg too proudspirited… Russia should suffer a couple more military failures”.
Port Arthur is not a shame, it’s fame of Russia and Russian arms. Consider the fact that 300 spartans didn’t actually win the battle of Thermopiles. Chinese naval base Lushun, as Port Arthur is now called, in spiritual sense is still a part of great and beautiful Russia of that time.
... to be continued ...
Last edited on Thu May 2nd, 2013 09:45 am by