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http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_17s6.html
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/a1_8_17s6.html
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/elliot/vol3/june16/
Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention
1788 Elliot 3:89, 430--36, 439--42
[6 June]
George Mason:
Among the enumerated powers, Congress are to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and to pay the debts, and to provide for the general welfare and common defence; and by that clause (so often called the sweeping clause) they are to make all laws necessary to execute those laws. Now, suppose oppressions should arise under this government, and any writer should dare to stand forth, and expose to the community at large the abuses of those powers; could not Congress, under the idea of providing for the general welfare, and under their own construction, say that this was destroying the general peace, encouraging sedition, and poisoning the minds of the people? And could they not, in order to provide against this, lay a dangerous restriction On the press? Might they not even bring the trial of this restriction within the ten miles square, when there is no prohibition against it? Might they not thus destroy the trial by jury?
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-anti-federalist-papers/speech-of-patrick-henry-(june-5-1788).php'
Patrick Henry: "Here is a revolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain. It is radical in this transition; our rights and privileges are endangered, and the sovereignty of the states will be relinquished: And cannot we plainly see that this is actually the case? The rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your immunities and franchises, all pretensions to human rights and privileges, are rendered insecure, if not lost, by this change, so loudly talked of by some, and inconsiderately by others."
AND
"Is it necessary for your liberty that you should abandon those great rights by the adoption of this system? Is the relinquishment of the trial by jury and the liberty of the press necessary for your liberty?"
AND:
"Consider what you are about to do before you part with this Government. Take longer time in reckoning things: Revolutions like this have happened in almost every country in Europe: Similar examples are to be found in ancient Greece and ancient Rome: Instances of the people losing their liberty by their carelessness and the ambition of a few. We are cautioned by the Honorable Gentleman who presides, against faction and turbulence: I acknowledge that licentiousness is dangerous, and that it ought to be provided against: I acknowledge also the new form of Government may effectually prevent it: Yet, there is another thing it will as effectually do: it will oppress and ruin the people. There are sufficient guards placed against sedition and licentiousness: For when power is given to this Government to suppress these, or, for any other purpose, the language it assumes is clear, express, and unequivocal; but when this Constitution speaks of privileges, there is an ambiguity,"
http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat_va_12.htm
June 14, 1788
Patrick Henry:
Mr. Chairman, it is now confessed that this is a national government. There is not a single federal feature in it. It has been alleged, within these walls, during the debates, to be national and federal, as it suited the arguments of gentlemen.
But now, when we have heard the definition of it, it is purely national.
June 17, 1788
George Mason:
Mr. Chairman, this is a fatal section, which has created more dangers than any other. The first clause allows the importation of slaves for twenty years. Under the royal government, this evil was looked upon as a great oppression, and many attempts were made to prevent it; but the interest of the African merchants prevented its prohibition. No sooner did the revolution take place, than it was thought of. It was one of the great causes of our separation from Great Britain. Its exclusion has been a principal object of this state, and most of the states in the Union. The augmentation of slaves weakens the states; and such a trade is diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind; yet, by this Constitution, it is continued for twenty years. As much as I value a union of all the states, I would not admit the Southern States into the Union unless they agree to the discontinuance of this disgraceful trade, because it would bring weakness, and not strength, to the Union.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/elliot/vol3/june17/
"A number of characters, of the greatest eminence in this country, object to this government for its consolidating tendency. This is not imaginary. It is a formidable reality. If consolidation proves to be as mischievous to this country as it has been to other countries, what will the poor inhabitants of this country do? This government will operate like an ambuscade. It will destroy the state governments, and swallow the liberties of the people, without giving previous notice. If gentlemen are willing to run the hazard, let them run it; but I shall exculpate myself by my opposition and monitory warnings within these walls. But then comes paper money. We are at peace on this subject. Though this is a thing which that mighty federal Convention had no business with, yet I acknowledge that paper money would be the bane of this country. I detest it. Nothing can justify a people in resorting to it but extreme necessity. It is at rest, however, in this commonwealth. It is no longer solicited or advocated."
Patrick Henry, Monday, June 9, 1788
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/elliot/vol3/june9/
Robert Yates, Brutus I, October 18, 1787:
"The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The powers of these courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of the same state; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution. One inferior court must be established, I presume, in each state at least, with the necessary executive officers appendant thereto. It is easy to see, that in the common course of things, these courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the state courts. These courts will be, in themselves, totally independent of the states, deriving their authority from the United States, and receiving from them fixed salaries; and in the course of human events it is to be expected, that they will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective states."
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/files/2018/09/Documents-and-Debates-in-American-History-and-Government-Vol.-1-and-Vol.-2.pdf Page 102
"The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and expensive, and justice as unattainable by a great part of the community, as in England; and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor."
George Mason, 1787
https://www.archives.gov/files/legislative/resources/education/bill-of-rights/images/mason.pdf
2. The Plan proposed-The 1st. Propn. withdrawn (15)-it was incompatible with the 2d. The
Principles were gradually unfolded-
The 1 Propn. accords with the Spirit of the Constn.
Each State is sovereign, free, and independt. etc. Sovereignty includes Equality-
If then the States in Union are as States still to con tinue in Union, they must be considered as
Equals-
13 sovereign and independent States can never constitute one Nation, and at the same Time be
States-they may by Treaty make one confederated Body-
Mr. Randolph-We ought to be one Nation-etc. The States as States must be cut up, and destroyed-
This is the way to form us into a Nation (16)-It has Equality-it will not break in upon the
Rights of any Citizen-it will destroy State Politicks and Attachmts. Will it be acceded to, etc.
G. Morris-Every Citizen should enjoy a rateable Proportion of Sovereignty-
The Mind of Man is fond of Power-
Enlarge his Prospects, you increase his Desires- Proportion of Votes-State- Politicks,
State-Attachments, State-Influence, State-Passions-Districts-
Great Britain and America-Suppose Representn. from the latter before the Revolutn. according to
the Quantum of Property or Number of Souls-Wt. the Consequence-
3 Article (17)-Com. Defence, Security of Liberty, mutual and general Welfare.
A national Govt. to operate individually upon the People in the first Instance, and not upon the
States- and therefore a Representation from the People at large and not from the States-
Will the Operation of the natl. Govt. depend upon the Mode of Representn. - No-it depends upon
the Quantum of Power lodged in the leg. ex. and judy. Departments-it will operate individually in
the one Case as well as in the other-
Why not operate upon the States-if they are coerced they will in Turn coerce each individual-
Let the People elect the State-Legr. -The State-Legr. elect the federal Legr. -assign to the
State Legr. its Duty-the same to the federal-they will be Checks upon each other, and the best
Checks that can be formed-Cong. the Sun of our political System-
Why a Representation from the People at large-to equalize Representn. Majr. Butler-Representn.
-Property-People-
The Consent of Rhode-Island will be necessary on the Jersey-Plan-
Views-to amend the Confedn. if not amendable, then to propose a new Governmt.-
. Whether the Articles of the Confedn. can be so reformed as to answer the Purposes of a
national Governmt.-
No Usurpation of Power in this Convention. The Spirit of the People in Favour of the Plan from
Virginia-
Powers pursued; if Powers wanting. we should do what is right.
Our Debts remain unpaid while the federal Govt. remains as it is-
The 13th. Article-provides for the alteration of the Articles, then of course for the Alteration
of the 5th. Article.
Powers in a deliberate Assembly-ridiculous-We are only to compare Sentiments- Disdain Danger, and
do what is necessary to our political Salvation-We must avail ourselves of the present Moment.
His Constituents will applaud, when he has done every Thing in his Power to relieve America-
No Provision agt. foreign Powers or Invasions. no Mony nor Men-Militia not sufficient-
No Provision agt. internal Insurrections. nor for the Maintenance of Treaties-
Coercion two Ways-1. as to Trade-2. as to an Army-
Legislation affecting Individuals the only Remedy. This Power too great to lodge in one Body-
Congress possess both Legislation and Execution-
The Variety of Interests (38) in the several States require a national Legislation; or else there
may be a Combination of States-
No Provision made or Power in Congress for the Suppression of Rebellion-no Troops can be
raised-Congress ought not to have the Power of raising Troops.
June 28th
Mr. Martin resumed his argument.
The Genl. Govt. is not to regulate the rights of Individuals, but that of States. The Genl. Govt.
is to Govern Sovereignties. then where the propriety of the several Branches-they cannot
exist-there can be no such checks.
Amphictyonick Council of Greece represented by two from each town-who were notwithsg. the dispn.
of the Towns equal-Rollins Ancient Hist. 4 Vol. pa. 79.
All the Ancient and Modern Confedns. and Leagues were as equals notwithstanding the vast
disproportions in size and wealth.
If the large States, who have got a Majority, will adhere to their plan, we cannot help it, but
we will publish to the world our plan and our principles, and leave it to judge.
Have we seen the Great Powers of Europe combining to oppress the small- (44)
Yes-the division of Poland.
They talk in vague Terms of the great States combining etc. (45)
Wants to know how it is possible that the large States can oppress the small (46)
The rule to tax the States according to their numbers would be cruel and unjust-it would Create a
war.
If you form the present Government, the States will be satisfied-and they will divide and
sub-divide so as to become nearly equal-
Notes of William Paterson in the Federal Convention of 1787
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/patterson.asp
Below is a quote from Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Convention of 1787.
Governor Randolph...in the notes by McHenry is pushing for dictatorship, seeking "benefits" from everyone capable of producing "benefits" in every state, so as then to have the power to keep the "benefits" flowing to the dictatorship. This criminal tells some very outrageous lies. It might be worth noting that those at the convention were either lured by lies, extorted, or were in agreement to get rid of the voluntary mutual defense association, so as to recreate a military dictatorship capable of extracting by criminal force their coveted "benefits."
"5. Inferior to State constitutions. State constitutions formed at an early period of the war, and by persons elected by the people for that purpose. These in general with one or two exceptions established about 1786 [sic]. The confederation was formed long after this, and had its ratification not by any special appointment from the people, but from the several assemblies. No judge will say that the confederation is paramount to a State consti[tu]tion."
That shows how the criminals were set on establishing summary justice courts, thereby over-powering rule of law, and trial by jury, which is the mechanism by which the people consent to - or do not consent to- government.
More from the dictator:
"Thus we see that the confederation is incompetent to any one object for which it was instituted. The framers of it wise and great men; but human rights were the chief knowle[d]ge of the times when it was framed so far as they applied to oppose Great Britain. Requisitions for men and money had never offered their form to our assemblies. None of those vices that have since discovered themselves were apprehended. Its defects therefore no reflextion [sic] on its contrivers.
Having pointed out its defects, let us not be affraid to view with a steady eye the perils with which we are surrounded. Look at the public countenance from New Hampshire to Georgia. Are we not on the eve of war, which is only prevented by the hopes from this convention.
Our chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions. It is a maxim which I hold incontrovertible, that the powers of government exercised by the people swallows [sic] up the other branches. None of the constitutions have provided sufficient checks against the democracy. The feeble Senate of Virginia is a phantom. Maryland has a more powerful senate, but the late distractions in that State, have discovered that it is not powerful enough. The check established in the constitution of New York and Massachusets is yet a stronger barrier against democracy, but they all seem insufficient."
Whistle blowing among the dictators (aristocratic souls):
"Gen. Pinkney-Thinks agreeing to the resolve is declaring that the convention does not act under the authority of the recommendation of Congress."
Next in the notes from McHenry are words that confess the fraud: to avoid admitting the fact that these criminals were usurping their authority given to them, and by this fraud they take absolute power.
"Mr. E. Gerry. Does not rise to speak to the merits of the question before the Committee but to the mode.
A distinction has been made between a federal and national government. We ought not to determine that there is this distinction for if we do, it is questionable not only whether this convention can propose an government totally different or whether Congress itself would have a right to pass such a resolution as that before the house. The commission from Massachusets empowers the deputies to proceed agreeably to the recommendation of Congress. This the foundation of the convention. If we have a right to pass this resolution we have a right to annihilate the confederation."
Next is the dictator (criminal covered in the color of law) named Morris re-defines the meaning of a federal agreement:
"Governeur Morris. Not yet ripe for a decision, because men seem to have affixed different explanations to the terms before the house. 1. We are not now under a foederal gover[n]ment. 2. There is no such thing. A foederal government is that which has a right to compel every part to do its duty. The foederal gov. has no such compelling capacities, whether considered in their legislative, judicial or Executive qualities."
See the first congress explanation of a federation and compare that to this opposite meaning. The original meaning of federation is a voluntary association, and now this new meaning is a "right" to "compel ever part to do its duty." The concept of equal footing, equality under the law, liberty, freedom, voluntary association, accurate accountability through equal protection "under" the law, is thrown out and replaced with a new meaning for federation, whereby the new meaning is that everyone will be "under" a "federal" government.
Morris: "We are not now under a foederal gover[n]ment." Meaning we are not now suffering under a despotic criminal organization covered under the color of law. But these criminals will do whatever is needed to place everyone under that criminal power.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/mchenry.asp
Switching gears here, so as to recheck a familiar characteristic of certain people whose actions confess their mindset. Those who are criminals, which include those who are dictators, set about in the minds to enforce any command that they dream up, and issue, to whomever they choose to command in time and place. Do this, they say, or else, they say, and then they follow up with action.
Above are characters in American history that represent these despotic, criminal, types. Now look at some words offered by the one who is attributed to be the author of the Articles of Confederation:
John Dickinson:
"The matter being thus stated, the assembly of New York either had, or had not, a right to refuse submission to that act. If they had, and I imagine no American will say they had not, then the parliament had no right to compel them to execute it. If they had not this right, they had no right to punish them for not executing it; and therefore no right to suspend their legislation, which is a punishment. In fact, if the people of New York cannot be legally taxed but by their own representatives, they cannot be legally deprived of the privilege of legislation, only for insisting on that exclusive privilege of taxation. If they may be legally deprived in such a case, of the privilege of legislation, why may they not, with equal reason, be deprived of every other privilege? Or why may not every colony be treated in the same manner, when any of them shall dare to deny their assent to any impositions, that shall be directed? Or what signifies the repeal of the Stamp Act, if these colonies are to lose their other privileges, by not tamely surrendering that of taxation?"
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/dickinson-empire-and-nation-letters-from-a-farmer
Type A personality is normal, this live and let live, free people, free in Liberty.
Type B hates Type A, and therefore Type B enslaves by any means, not limited to deception, threat of aggressive violence, nor aggressive violence upon the innocent.
Richard Henry Lee (not present at the Con Con) answers the false claims made by the despotic false federalists:
"But what do we mean by a federal republic and what by a consolidated government? To erect a federal republic, we must first make a number of states on republican principles; each state with a government organized for the internal management of its affairs: The states, as such, must unite under a federal head, and delegate to it powers to make and execute laws in certain enumerated cases, under certain restrictions; this head may be a single assembly, like the present congress, or the Amphictionic council; or it may consist of a legislature, with one or more branches; of an executive, and of a judiciary. To form a consolidated, or one entire government, there[163] must be no state, or local governments, but all things, persons and property, must be subject to the laws of one legislature alone; to one executive, and one judiciary. Each state government, as the government of New Jersey etc., is a consolidated, or one entire government, as it respects the counties, towns, citizens, and property within the limits of the state. The state governments are the basis, the pillar on which the federal head is placed, and the whole together, when formed on elective principles, constitutes a federal republic. A federal republic in itself supposes state or local governments to exist, as the body or props, on which the federal head rests, and that it cannot remain a moment after they cease. In erecting the federal government, and always in its councils, each state must be known as a sovereign body; but in erecting this government, I conceive, the legislature of the state, by the expressed or implied assent of the people, or the people of the state, under the direction of the government of it, may accede to the federal compact: Nor do I conceive it to be necessarily a part of a confederacy of states, that each have an equal voice in the general councils. A confederated republic being organized, each state must retain powers for managing its internal police, and all delegate to the union power to mange general concerns: The quantity of power the union must possess is one thing, the mode of exercising the powers given, is quite a different consideration; and it is the mode of exercising them, that makes one of the essential distinctions between one entire or consolidated government, and a federal republic; that is, however the government may be organized, if the laws of the union, in most important concerns, as in levying and collecting taxes, raising troops, etc. operate immediately upon the persons and property of individuals, and not on states, extend to organizing the militia, etc. the government, as to its administration, as to making and executing laws, is not federal, but consolidated. To illustrate my idea—the union makes a requisition, and assigns to each state its quota of men or monies wanted; each state, by its own laws and officers, in its own way, furnishes its quota: here the state governments stand between the union and individuals; the laws of the union operate only on states, as such, and federally: Here nothing can be done without the meetings of the state legislatures—but in the other case the union, though[164] the state legislatures should not meet for years together, proceeds immediately, by its own laws and officers, to levy and collect monies of individuals, to enlist men, form armies, etc. Here the laws of the union operate immediately on the body of the people, on persons and property; in the same manner the laws of one entire consolidated government operate—These two modes are very distinct, and in their operation and consequences have directly opposite tendencies: The first makes the existence of the state governments indispensable, and throws all the detail business of levying and collecting the taxes, etc. into the hands of those governments, and into the hands, of course, of many thousand officers solely created by and dependent on the state. The last entirely excludes the agency of the respective states, and throws the whole business of levying and collecting taxes, etc. into the hands of many thousand officers solely created by, and dependent upon the union, and makes the existence of the state government of no consequence in the case. It is true, congress in raising any given sum in direct taxes, must by the constitution, raise so much of it in one state, and so much in another, by a fixed rule, which most of the states some time since agreed to: But this does not affect the principle in question, it only secures each state against any arbitrary proportions. The federal mode is perfectly safe and eligible, founded in the true spirit of a confederated republic; there could be no possible exception to it, did we not find by experience, that the states will sometimes neglect to comply with the reasonable requisitions of the union. It being according to the fundamental principles of federal republics, to raise men and monies by requisitions, and for the states individually to organize and train the militia, I conceive, there can be no reason whatever for departing from them, except this, that the states sometimes neglect to comply with reasonable requisitions, and that it is dangerous to attempt to compel a delinquent state by force, as it may often produce a war. We ought, therefore, to inquire attentively, how extensive the evils to be guarded against are, and cautiously limit the remedies to the extent of the evils. I am not about to defend the confederation, or to charge the proposed constitution with imperfections not in it; but we ought to examine facts, and strip them of the false colorings often given them[165] by incautious observations, by unthinking or designing men. We ought to premise, that laws for raising men and monies, even in consolidated governments, are not often punctually complied with. Historians, except in extraordinary cases, very seldom take notice of the detail collection of taxes; but these facts we have fully proved, and well attested; that the most energetic governments have relinquished taxes frequently, which were of many years standing. These facts amply prove, that taxes assessed, have remained many years uncollected. I agree there have been instances in the republics of Greece, Holland, etc. in the course of several centuries, of states neglecting to pay their quotas of requisitions; but it is a circumstance certainly deserving of attention, whether these nations which have depended on requisitions principally for their defense, have not raised men and monies nearly as punctually as entire governments, which have taxed directly; whether we have not found the latter as often distressed for the want of troops and monies, as the former. It has been said that the Amphictionic council, and the Germanic head, have not possessed sufficient powers to control the members of the republic in a proper manner. Is this, if true, to be imputed to requisitions? Is it not principally to be imputed to the unequal powers of those members, connected with this important circumstance, that each member possessed power to league itself with foreign powers, and powerful neighbors, without the consent of the head? After all, has not the Germanic body a government as good as its neighbors in general? And did not the Grecian republic remain united several centuries, and form the theater of human greatness? No government in Europe has commanded monies more plentifully than the government of Holland. As to the United States, the separate states lay taxes directly, and the union calls for taxes by way of requisitions; and is it a fact, that more monies are due in proportion on requisitions in the United States, than on the state taxes directly laid? It is only about ten years since congress began to make requisitions, and in that time, the monies, etc. required, and the bounties given for men required of the states, have amounted, specie value, to about 36 million dollars, about 24 millions of dollars of which have been actually paid; and a very considerable part of the 12 millions not paid, remains so[166] not so much from the neglect of the states, as from the sudden changes in paper money, etc. which in a great measure rendered payments of no service, and which often induced the union indirectly to relinquish one demand, by making another in a different form. Before we totally condemn requisitions, we ought to consider what immense bounties the states gave, and what prodigious exertions they made in the war, in order to comply with the requisitions of congress; and if since the peace they have been delinquent, ought we not carefully to inquire, whether that delinquency is to be imputed solely to the nature of requisitions? Ought it not in part to be imputed to two other causes? I mean first, an opinion, that has extensively prevailed, that the requisitions for domestic interest have not been founded on just principles; and secondly, the circumstance, that the government itself, by proposing imposts, etc. has departed virtually from the constitutional system; which proposed changes, like all changes proposed in government, produce an inattention and negligence in the execution of the government in being."
Richard Henry Lee, 1787
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/dickinson-empire-and-nation-letters-from-a-farmer