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by William Watkins
"Second, federalism permits the states to operate as laboratories of democracy-to experiment with various policies and Programs. For example, if Tennessee wanted to provide a state-run health system for its citizens, the other 49 states could observe the effects of this venture on Tennessee's economy, the quality of care provided, and the overall cost of health care. If the plan proved to be efficacious other states might choose to emulate it, or adopt a plan taking into account any problems surfacing in Tennessee. If the plan proved to be a disastrous intervention, the other 49 could decide to leave the provision of medical care to the private sector. With national plans and programs, the national officials simply roll the dice for all 284 million people of the United States and hope they get things right.
"Experimentation in policymaking also encourages a healthy competition among units of government and allows the people to vote with their feet should they find a law of policy detrimental to their interests. Using again the state-run health system as an example, if a citizen of Tennessee was unhappy with Tennessee's meddling with the provisions of health care, the citizen could move to a neighboring state. Reallocation to a state like North Carolina, with a similar culture and climate, would not be a dramatic shift and would be a viable option. Moreover, if enough citizens exercised this option, Tennessee would be pressured to abandon its foray into socialized medicine, or else lose much of its tax base. To escape a national health system, a citizen would have to emigrate to a foreign country, an option far less appealing and less likely to be exercised than moving to a neighboring state. Without competition from other units of government, the national government would have much less incentive than Tennessee would to modify the objectionable policy. Clearly, the absence of experimentation and competition hampers the creation of effective programs and makes the modification of failed national programs less likely."
http://www.amazon.com/Reclaiming-American-Revolution-Kentucky-Resolutions/sim/1403963037/2?o=9
St. George Tucker on Confederation
This idea of a confederate, or federal, republic, was probably borrowed from Montesquieu, who treats of it as an expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling internal freedom with external security, as hath been mentioned elsewhere. The experience of the practicability and benefit of such a system, was recent in the memory of every American, from the success of the revolutionary war, concluded but a few years before; during the continuance of which the states entered into a perpetual alliance and confederacy with each other. Large concessions of the rights of sovereignty were thereby made to congress; but the system was defective in not providing adequate means, for a certain, and regular revenue; congress being altogether dependent upon the legislatures of the several states for supplies, although the latter, by the terms of compact, were bound to furnish, whatever the former should deem it necessary to require. At the close of the war, it was found that congress had contracted debts, without a revenue to discharge them; that they had entered into treaties, which they had not power to fulfil; that the several states possessed sources of an extensive commerce, for which they could not find any vent. These evils were ascribed to the defects of the existing confederation; and it was said that the principles of the proposed constitution were to be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of the principles contained in the articles of confederation: that in the latter those principles were so feeble and confined, as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which had been urged against it; that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited, and that the states, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdictions. This construction has since been fully confirmed by the twelfth article of amendments,3 which declares, “that the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” This article was added “to prevent misconstruction or abuse” of the powers granted by the constitution,4 rather than supposed necessary to explain and secure the rights of the states, or of the people. The powers delegated to the federal government being all positive, and enumerated, according to the ordinary rules of construction, whatever is not enumerated is retained; for, expressum facit tacere tacitum is a maxim in all cases of construction: it is likewise a maxim of political law, that sovereign states cannot be deprived of any of their rights by implication; nor in any manner whatever by their own voluntary consent, or by submission to a conqueror.
The Reconstruction Amendments Kurt Lash
https://www.cato.org/events/reconstruction-amendments-essential-documents
Page 4 Luther Martin
"The members of the convention from the States, came there under different powers; the greatest number, I believe, under powers nearly the same as those of the delegates of this State. Some came to the convention under the former appointment, authorizing the meeting of delegates merely to regulate trade. Those of the Delaware were expressly instructed to agree to no system, which should take away from the States that equality of suffrage secured by the original articles of confederation. Before I arrived, a number of rules had been adopted to regulate the proceedings of the convention, by one of which was to affect the whole Union. By another, the doors were to be shut, and the whole proceedings were to be kept secret; and so far did this rule extend, that we were thereby prevented from corresponding with gentlemen in the different States upon the subjects under our discussion; a circumstance, Sir, which, I confess, I greatly regretted. I had no idea, that all the wisdom, integrity, and virtue of this State, or of the others, were centered in the convention. I wished to have corresponded freely and confidentially with eminent political characters in my own and other States; not implicitly to be dictated to by them, but to give their sentiments due weight and consideration. So extremely solicitous were they, that their proceedings should not transpire, that the members were prohibited even from taking copies of resolutions, on which the convention were deliberating, or extracts of any kind from the journals, without formally moving for, and obtaining permission, by vote of the convention for that purpose.
"But, Sir, it was to no purpose that the futility of their objections were shown, when driven from the pretense, that the equality of suffrage had been originally agreed to on principles of expediency and necessity; the representatives of the large States persisting in a declaration, that they would never agree to admit the smaller States to an equality of suffrage. In answer to this, they were informed, and informed in terms that most strong, and energetic that could possibly be used, that we never would agree to a system giving them the undue influence and superiority they proposed. That we would risk every possible consequence. That from anarchy and confusion, order might arise. That slavery was the worst that could ensue, and we considered the system proposed to be the most complete, most abject system of slavery that the wit of man ever devised, under pretense of forming a government for free States. That we never would submit tamely and servilely, to a present certain evil, in dread of a future, which might be imaginary; that we were sensible the eyes of our country and the world were upon us. That we would not labor under the imputation of being unwilling to form a strong and energetic federal government; but we would publish the system which we approved, and also that which we opposed, and leave it to our country, and the world at large, to judge between us, who best understood the rights of free men and free States, and who best advocated them; and to the same tribunal we could submit, who ought to be answerable for all the consequences, which might arise to the Union from the convention breaking up, without proposing any system to their constituents. During this debate we were threatened, that if we did not agree to the system proposed, we never should have an opportunity of meeting in convention to deliberate on another, and this was frequently urged. In answer, we called upon them to show what was to prevent it, and from what quarter was our danger to proceed; was it from a foreign enemy? Our distance from Europe, and the political situation of that country, left us but little to fear. Was there any ambitious State or States, who, in violation of every sacred obligation, was preparing to enslave the other States, and raise itself to consequence on the ruin of the others? Or was there any such ambitious individual? We did not apprehend it to be the case; but suppose it to be true, it rendered it the more necessary, that we should sacredly guard against a system, which might enable all those ambitious views to be carried into effect, even under the sanction of the constitution and government. In fine, Sir, all those threats were treated with contempt, and they were told, that we apprehended but one reason to prevent the States meeting again in convention; that, when they discovered the part this convention had acted, and how much its members were abusing the trust reposed in them, the States would never trust another convention."
https://archive.org/details/secretproceedin00convgoog/page/n38/mode/2up?view=theater
https://www.amazon.com/Secret-Proceedings-Debates-Constitutional-Convention/dp/1410203638
Con Con